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HOSING DOWN SENIOR CLAIMS WITH A
QUICKER AND DIRTIER CHAPTER 11
CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR.-
Professors LoPucki and Whitford (L & W) have written an interesting
paper.' It builds on their earlier article on corporate governance.2  A
thorough critique would require a confrontation with the basic underpin-
nings of Chapter 11 (as it exists or as it might be revised), a project beyond
the scope of this comment. So I shall defer, for the most part, more
overarching observations on Chapter 11 in order to address some specific
points raised in their paper. There is both much to admire and much to
question in the paper. I shall turn first to the premises and proposals with
which I agree.
L & W would have the Bankruptcy Code impose an express duty on a
Chapter 11 debtor in possession to pursue what they call "optimal invest-
ment policies," or "OIPS" (a bit like "OOPS"), instead of the "prudent
investment policies," or "PIPS,"that they claim are the norm in Chapter 11.
Assuming that the pursuit of OIPS maximizes wealth (an assumption that
is not necessarily accurate), I applaud their goal.
Presumably this wealth-maximizing OIPS standard would override other
considerations, such as the (noncreditor) interests of employees in a plant
that would be closed and other so-called "community" interests that might
conflict with the unswerving pursuit of OIPS. I believe that L & W have
this part right as well.' One would hope that they would not have OIPS
rescue the shareholders, even if it puts the unsecured creditors at greater
risk, only to forgo OIPS if the result would harm those who do not even
have claims or interests.4
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for
Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 1133 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki
& Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors].
2. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorga-
nization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. RPv. 669 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance].
3. Perhaps I am hoping against hope that I am reading L & W correctly. In their earlier article
they criticized wealth-maximization as an abstract strategy, apparently because that approach fails to
take account of costs imposed on persons other than creditors and interest holders. See LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 752.
4. Alternatively, perhaps L & W would permit the interested segments of the "community" to
make risk compensation payments to those adversely affected by a deviation from 01PS.
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I also applaud the principle that underlies L & W's proposal for "risk
compensation payments" to those who are placed at greater risk by the
pursuit of OIPS: "[W]hen one party's rights are commandeered for the
benefit of the group, the group should compensate that party."' In their
example,6 when the debtor in possession pursues OIPS for the benefit of
the shareholders who stand to gain, L & W maintain that the shareholders
must compensate the unsecured creditors for their losses (or additional risk)
and although not applicable in the example, extinguish any junior claims.
If the shareholders wish management to gamble with the prospective
distributions to the unsecured creditors (95% to 100%, in the example),
they should put their money on the line.
I could embrace happily principled law reforms that would enhance
wealth and cause winners to compensate losers. Unfortunately, I worry that
the scheme that L & W have proposed would achieve neither goal. It is
not clear that the scheme would enhance wealth. In some cases it may give
junior interests something for nothing and give senior interests nothing for
something. And it could do so without the prophylactic structure of the
plan confirmation process. I now turn to this dark side of the L & W
proposal.
Consider again the restaurant firm example.' A quick liquidation would
pay the unsecured creditors in full-$100 million-leaving nothing for the
shareholders. Pursuit of PIPS also would result in a payout of $100 million
when the plan is confirmed after two years, resulting in an assumed present
value of unsecured claims equal to $95 million. Again, the shareholders
would receive nothing. The OIPS approach, however, would have the firm
hock all of its assets, borrow $100 million, and adopt a new format for the
restaurants. Under the L & W risk compensation scheme, the shareholders
would transfer 84% of the stock to the creditors and would retain 16%.
OIPS has a 50% probability of success.8 If it succeeds, the creditors will
be paid in full and will have, in addition, stock worth $117.6 million, while
the current shareholders' stock would be worth $22.4 million. If the OIPS
plan fails, the postpetition secured lender will be paid in full and the
prepetition creditors and shareholders will receive nothing.
As proposed, the L & W risk compensation scheme harbors at least two
major flaws. First, the determination of OIPS and the application of the
risk compensation scheme are so indeterminate and controversial that the
5. LoPucki & Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors, supra note 1, at 1147.
6. Id. passim.
7. Id. at 1137-39.
8. I shall overlook the fact that no sane secured lender would extend credit if it knew there was
a 50% chance of default and foreclosure.
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current system could not cope satisfactorily. Second, the risk compensation
payments are inadequate.
L & W seem to believe that OIPS and PIPS, and the expected results of
each, are sufficiently determinable to enable management to devise
assumptions like those in their example. Without such assumptions, one
cannot apply the "risk compensation" formula. But how can anyone really
know "facts" such as this package of assumptions? How can anyone know
that there is a 50% (as opposed to a 70% or a 30%) risk of success or
failure? How can anyone know that if the project is successful the value
of the assets will be $240 million greater than the secured debt? In real
life one can only attempt such predictions. Although we might believe that
there is an equal chance of success or failure, we also know that there is
great uncertainty as to that probability. L & W fail to address the softness
of these factual assumptions.9
Consider also the ultimate arbiter of these facts upon which the course
of the firm will turn. In all likelihood, the shareholders and management
are arguing that the OIPS tack is a "can't miss." The unsecured creditors
no doubt are urging that this is the worst idea since "New Coke." And
each group surely has well-paid experts to vouch for their conclusions.
Probably nobody is claiming that there is only a 50% chance of success.
Who decides? The decision will be made by (or negotiated in the shadow
of) the bankruptcy judge.'"
In stay-lifting litigation the court typically must determine the value of
discrete collateral." But the closest analogue to OIPS litigation under
current law is stay-lifting litigation concerning the prospects of an effective
reorganization." That decision is merely an up or down proposition. L
& W, however, have proposed a model that, in their example, has the
bankruptcy judge approving management's claim that OIPS will increase
the market value of the firm from $100 million to $105 million. 3 I doubt
9. Data rounded to the nearest 1000 cannot produce a meaningful result calculated to the third
decimal place; garbage in, garbage out. By the same token, when the assessments of future business
operations and the probabilities of various results are sufficiently speculative, slight variations in
prospective valuations and probabilities are not significant.
10. Some will not be surprised by the confidence that L & W place in the ability of the bankruptcy
courts to get it right. See James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost
School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993).
11. See I 1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988) (providing that the automatic stay will be lifted "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property").
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988) (providing that the automatic stay will be lifted if "the debtor
does not have an equity in such property" and "such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization"). Those who hail the judicial reluctance, at least early in Chapter 11 cases, to find that
an effective reorganization is unlikely will warmly embrace the OIPS model.
13. LoPucki & Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors, supra note 1, at 1138 tbl. 2.
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that the salami can be sliced that thin. L & W's proposal would let
management and the bankruptcy judge do just about whatever they want
with very little risk that the determination could be found clearly erroneous.
The determination would not be clearly anything-correct or erroneousl
The proposal would ensure substantial litigation over OIPS and PIPS.
L & W acknowledge that the factual determinations would be "quick and
dirty," but argue that seat-of-the-pants, rough-justice calculations involving
"guesswork" should be enough to induce OIPS."4 Maybe so, but the risk
compensation payments are the whole ball game for the unsecured creditors
here. In the example, the creditors would give up a recovery of $95 to
$100 million and would be exposed to a 50% chance of no recovery
whatsoever.
The OIPS proposal imposes on management a litigation model of
corporate governance. Maybe management, operating in the shadow of
competing claims for risk compensation and oversight by the bankruptcy
judge, will get it right. But I wonder why the management that landed the
firm in Chapter 11 can now be so sure of its strategy. And if the OIPS/risk
compensation proposal is anywhere close to an optimal system, I wonder
why corporate boards and officers operate as they do instead of holding
hearings before a neutral arbitrator to resolve important management
decisions. Also conspicuously absent in the L & W proposal is evidence
of the management approach taken by firms before filing for Chapter 11
and by firms who have not filed for Chapter 11. Did the management
strategy of those firms more closely resemble PIPS or OIPS? To pose a
metaphor based on health, not wealth, if one could learn much about
corporate governance from looking only at firms in Chapter 11, the field
of preventive medicine would be dominated by forensic pathologists.
Even if the indeterminacy of the judicial model of OIPS were solved, my
most serious concern about the L & W proposal would remain-the
conception of "risk compensation payments." Not only would the proposed
transfers to the unsecured creditors in the example fail to compensate the
creditors for their additional risk, but the contemplated transfers are not
payments at all.
Under PIPS, the unsecured creditors have a 100% chance of being fully
paid $100 million, with a present value of $95 million. Under OIPS, they
will have a 50% chance of receiving $0 on their claims. How would L &
14. Moreover, L & W also acknowledge that: "The creditor-shareholder dichotomy that we have
employed throughout this paper is, in at least one important respect, an oversimplification of the
problem .... In a large, publicly held company, there are likely to be claims, and perhaps even shares,
having several levels of priority." LoPucki & Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors, supra note
1, at 1147.
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W compensate the unsecured creditors for the risk that they will lose
everything? The creditors would receive stock. If, as the unsecured
creditors fear, OIPS fails, the creditors receive nothing even after taking
account of the risk compensation payments. That is because they received,
as a protection against the risk of failure, something that by definition will
be worthless upon failure. Go figure.
One response to my analysis is that the creditors received something that
the bankruptcy judge says is worth $51 million, leaving the original
shareholders with stock that the bankruptcy judge says is worth about $10
million. But does anyone really believe this valuation? Would the
unsecured creditors really believe it? If these values were real, would not
there be someone in the world who would pay the unsecured creditors $51
million in exchange for the stock? Would not the original shareholders pay
$51 million for $61 million of stock if they were real believers? If there
is a market for the stock, of course, the unsecured creditors could simply
sell their shares. But if there were such a market, the firm could issue new
shares and pay the creditors. If there is not a market, should not the
shareholders be required to pay the unsecured creditors with real money
instead of OIPS play money? If nobody in the world is willing to pay $51
million for the stock to be given to the unsecured creditors, is it too radical
to venture that it may not be worth $51 million? To be adequate, the risk
allocation payments must be real payments, not merely allocations of junior
interests.1
5
Consider the result if, on the day after the judge ordered that the L & W
version of risk allocation payments be made to the unsecured creditors,
those same creditors (who now own five-sixths of the stock) came to court
and said: "The proposed OIPS business plan stinks. We are the ones who
have the most to lose and the most to gain and we want out; please
liquidate." Would the judge be bound to ignore their pleas? Should the
creditors' residual status disenfranchise them as shareholders? Once risk
compensation payments have been allowed, is that the end of the matter?
Would the case stay in a constant state of flux, with various parties reacting
to the ebb and flow of the debtor's fortunes and foibles with their own
repetitive calls for risk compensation payments?
I do not want to leave the impression that I see no room and no need for
a system of risk compensation payments. For example, it might be wise
to clarify the Bankruptcy Code to make it clear that consensual and
15. For example, an administrative expense priority cannot qualify as adequate protection of a
property interest. 11 I.S.C. § 361(3) (1988). It would be anomalous to treat an equity interest in a
debtor as the "indubitable equivalent" of a creditor's claim against a solvent (or near-solvent) debtor.
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voluntary risk compensation payments are permitted and, perhaps,
encouraged. But judicially forcing parties to accept junior interests
calculated on enormously complex and difficult assessments of competing
business plans goes too far.
Finally, I confess, as I must, that my distrust of the L & W OIPS/risk
compensation scheme derives in part from my view of bankruptcy and its
relationship to private rights and interests. Whether a claim is based in
contract or tort, it is commonly accepted that what distinguishes an
enforceable claim from something else is the ability to call upon the state's
judicial system in order to recover on the claim. The world would not have
to work that way, of course. The state could decline to intervene in and
settle purely private matters, but our legal culture is otherwise.
When a claimant does employ the judicial system to recover on a claim,
the end game converts the obligor's property into property of the claimant,
such as by levy of execution, sheriff's sale, and so forth. Bankruptcy is a
part of that system. Its domain is an orderly procedure that should allow
claimants to obtain at least as much as they would have obtained in the
nonbankruptcy enforcement process, and perhaps more. But bankruptcy
law and efforts to "reform" it largely remain captured. They are captured
by those who have nurtured bankruptcy as an insular cottage industry, an
alternative form of business structure, a government, a religion, and as
something very, very special. The L & W proposal is of the cottage
industry genre, seemingly profound but in reality only tinkering with the
fine points.
Bankruptcy is civil procedure-no less but absolutely no more.
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